e in uence of the pro-Israel lobby in US foreign policymaking toward the Middle East has been a subject of great interest and erce controversy in recent years. Yet, despite being the object of a massive amount of critical scrutiny, the pro-Israel lobby remains poorly understood. All too o en it is depicted as a highly organized, cohesive political actor pursuing an agenda in line with, and even determined by, Israel's right-wing Likud party. By undertaking a detailed empirical survey of the pro-Israel community in the United States, this article shows that such a view is grossly inaccurate.
Current discussions of US-Israeli relations, the Israeli-Palestinian con ict, and Middle East politics more generally rarely take place without some mention of the pro-Israel lobby in the United States. e so-called Israel lobby is frequently blamed for supporting and encouraging Israeli aggression against the Palestinians and Lebanese, for America's unwillingness to pressure or even criticize Israel, and even for the US 2003 invasion of Iraq and more recent threats against Iran. ere is even a cottage industry on the Internet devoted to uncovering and reporting on the many machinations and misdeeds of the Israel lobby.
Denunciations of the nefarious in uence of the pro-Israel lobby are by no means a new thing. " e lobby" has long been blamed by supporters of the Palestinians in the United States and elsewhere for what they perceive as America's pro-Israel "bias, " and for its consequent failure to hold Israel accountable for its aggressive military actions and human rights violations, and to pressure it to make the necessary concessions to the Palestinians for the sake of peace.
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For many years, how-ever, this argument remained on the margins of American political debate about the Israeli-Palestinian con ict. To express it was to identify oneself as "anti-Israel" and position oneself on the far le or far right of the political spectrum.
Today, that is no longer the case. is view has migrated into mainstream opinion. Indeed, it has almost become the conventional wisdom in liberal society in the United States, and certainly in Western Europe. It has gained new force with the collapse of the Oslo peace process and the resurgence of Israeli-Palestinian violence in 2000, and it has gained greater respectability as it has found some very prominent advocates, most notably former president Jimmy Carter and professors John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt. President Carter's book Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid 2 and Mearsheimer and Walt's book e Israel Lobby 3 both quickly became best-sellers and sparked heated controversies. ey were hailed by some as courageous voices willing to challenge the vaunted power of the pro-Israel lobby, 4 while others dismissed them as simplistic and misguided at best, bigoted at worst. 5 Undoubtedly, the pro-Israel lobby has, for better or for worse, become the subject of great interest, much of it highly critical. 6 e recent debate that has taken place over the role of the pro-Israel lobby in American foreign policymakingsparked in particular by Mearsheimer and Walt's critique-has focused almost exclusively on the question of the lobby's power. Is it really as powerful as its critics suggest? Does it have a "stranglehold" on Congress? 7 What in uence does it exert over the executive branch? ese questions have animated the debate and have given rise to two broad camps-those who regard the pro-Israel lobby as immensely powerful, able to exercise a decisive impact on America's Middle East policy, especially concerning Israel and the Palestinians; and those who minimize the signi cance of the lobby and see American policy as driven much more by national interests, public opinion, and possibly cultural factors as well (like shared values with Israel and a sense of cultural commonality).
I will not take sides in this debate here, except to note that-as is so o en the case with such debates-both sides are guilty of over-simpli cation and some exaggeration. Domestic politics, including the activism of pro-Israel advocacy groups, certainly has some bearing on American policymaking. No administration is entirely immune from it, and members of Congress are particularly susceptible to it. Indeed, if pro-Israel lobbying was irrelevant to the formation of US policymaking toward Israel and the Middle East, pro-Israel lobby groups would have no reason to exist and would probably have disappeared long ago. e continued vitality of such groups o ers clear evidence of their utility. ey do not control American foreign policy, but they can make some di erence at the margins. Ultimately, the power of pro-Israel lobby groups is context-dependent and issue-dependent.
e purpose of this article, however, is not to assess the political in uence of the pro-Israel lobby. is has already been done in countless articles. 8 Rather than examine the lobby's power, this article examines what the pro-Israel lobby really is. It disaggregates the lobby and looks at the myriad of pro-Israel groups that compose it. If one problem with the debate that has taken place over the pro-Israel lobby has been the tendency of both sides to overstate their cases and present the debate in either-or terms (i.e., either the lobby is all-powerful or it is insigni cant), another problem has been the failure to really examine what the pro-Israel lobby actually is. Despite the massive amounts of critical scrutiny that the pro-Israel lobby has received in recent years, there has been remarkably little attention paid to examining its actual composition.
All too o en, the pro-Israel lobby is depicted in the media as a highly organized, cohesive political actor pursuing an agenda in line with, and even determined by, Israel's right-wing Likud party. 9 is article will show that such a view is grossly inaccurate. e pro-Israel lobby is neither monolithic nor a unitary actor. It is fragmented, internally divided by disagreements over what is in Israel's best interests and what is the proper role that Americans Jews should play in supporting Israel. 10 e diversity of opinion within the pro-Israel community in the United States concerning these basic questions contradicts the widespread perception of the proIsrael lobby as a right-wing monolith. By surveying the pro-Israel community in the United States, this article seeks to provide a more accurate and nuanced understanding of the pro-Israel lobby than that re ected in much of the vitriolic public debate over it that has taken place in recent years. A better grasp of the makeup of the pro-Israel community in the United States is important not only because it can help inform the ongoing debate over its activities, but also because it can a ect how policy-makers in the United States and Israel relate to pro-Israel groups.
De ning the Pro-Israel Lobby
What is the pro-Israel lobby? What organizations comprise it, and what views do they have? In the midst of all the controversy over the pro-Israel lobby's activities, these basic questions frequently go unanswered. Neither its detractors nor its defenders bother to really look at the makeup of the pro-Israel lobby in the United States. Indeed, the term pro-Israel lobby is generally used without any elaboration or de nition. Very o en, the term is used in conjunction with the American Israel Public A airs Committee (AIPAC) so that the two entities become essentially indistinguishable, even identical. Although AIPAC stands out as the most prominent pro-Israel lobby group in the United States-and even bills itself as "America's pro-Israel lobby"-it is only one of many. AIPAC does not enjoy a monopoly on pro-Israel advocacy. Unlike some other domestic American lobbies de ned by a single organization, the eld of pro-Israel advocacy is a crowded one with groups promoting di erent agendas and perspectives. To equate the pro-Israel lobby with AIPAC is, therefore, inaccurate and misleading.
Equally problematic is equating the pro-Israel lobby with Israeli governments as if the lobby were completely beholden to it and following its orders.
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is too is inaccurate and misleading because it ignores the fact that pro-Israel groups are independent actors whose views can di er, sometimes signi cantly, from that of Israeli governments, and that the former can take actions that may be opposed by the latter. During the early years of the Oslo peace process, for example, the Rabin government complained that some pro-Israel organizations in the United States were acting against its policies and attempting to undermine the peace process.
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In November 2007, a number of right-wing Jewish groups in the United States publicly insisted before and a er the US-sponsored Annapolis summit meeting between Israel's Olmert government and the Palestinian Authority that Jerusalem must remain Israel's undivided capital, opposing Prime Minister Olmert's willingness to make territorial concessions on Jerusalem.
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Even when the term pro-Israel lobby is de ned, it may be employed in a careless and slippery manner. In their book, Mearsheimer and Walt de ne it as "a convenient shorthand term for the loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively work to shape U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction. " 14 ey elaborate on the de nition by stating: "To be part of the lobby … one has to actively work to move American foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction. For an organization, this pursuit must be an important part of its mission and consume a substantial percentage of its resources and agenda. For an individual, this means devoting some portion of one's professional or personal life (or in some cases, substantial amounts of money) to in uencing U.S. Middle East policy. " 15 Moreover, unlike many of their admirers, Mearsheimer and Walt are careful to note that: " e lobby is not a single, uni ed movement with a central leadership, however, and individuals and groups that make up this broad coalition sometimes disagree on speci c issues. " 16 ey reiterate this point later when they write that "it would be clearly wrong to think of the lobby as a single-minded monolith. "
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Contrary to the claims of some of their most strident detractors, Mearsheimer and Walt do not treat the Israel lobby as some kind of right-wing cabal. 18 e problem, rather, is that their description of the pro-Israel lobby is too broad and elastic. According to them, the Israel lobby is not only composed of formal lobbying organizations (most notably AIPAC), but also think tanks (such as the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the Jewish Institute for National Security A airs), and numerous individual American Jews, Christian evangelicals, and neo-conservatives. Especially problematic is the inclusion within the Israel lobby of neo-conservative policymakers, pundits, and thinkers. Neoconservatives, both Jewish and gentile, are not simply lobbyists for Israel. Although they may indeed be pro-Israel in their sympathies, their foremost concern is with the United States-its interests, values, and global role.
It is necessary to de ne the pro-Israel lobby in the United States more narrowly to refer solely to an assortment of formal organizations that try to in uence American policy toward Israel in a direction that they believe is in Israel's interests. 19 e members of these groups are mostly American Jews, but there is also now a large number of evangelical Christian Zionists involved in pro-Israel activities 20 -which is why the term pro-Israel lobby should be used rather than Jewish lobby. 21 e pro-Israel lobby is de ned by its political agenda, not by religion or ethnicity. e pro-Israel lobby, then, is composed of groups who actively lobby the US government on issues concerning Israel. ese groups do not necessarily represent the views of American Jews, Israelis, or whatever Israeli government is in power, although some may try to do so with varying degrees of success; and though they all de ne themselves as pro-Israel, they can have widely di erent interpretations of what this actually means in practice.
A Fractious Community
Pro-Israel groups seldom agree among themselves, let alone act in unison. Although they try to promote Israel's interests, they di er greatly in their views on what Israel's interests actually are. Some groups oppose Israel's continued occupation of territories gained in the 1967 War; others staunchly support Israel's control over these territories-for security, historical, or religious reasons (or a combination of them). Some support the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; others are adamantly opposed to this. Some ercely resist any American pressure on Israel; others oppose unconditional American support for Israeli policies and favor a more even-handed US role in Arab-Israeli peacemaking. e designation "pro-Israel, " therefore, tells us very little about the speci c policies for which di erent organizations actually lobby.
What unites pro-Israel groups is not their stance on speci c policies, but their attitude toward the State of Israel. An unwavering commitment to the survival of Israel as a Jewish state is, fundamentally, what distinguishes pro-Israel groups from other organizations involved in lobbying the US government on Middle East issues.
22
Every pro-Israel group is motivated by a bedrock concern for securing Israel's existence as a Jewish state (the fact that they want Israel to exist as a Jewish state is what di erentiates pro-Israel groups from non-Zionist or even anti-Zionist groups that are outside the pro-Israel tent).
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Where pro-Israel groups part ways is in their understanding of how best to ensure Israeli security. ere is no consensus among pro-Israel groups over what is necessary for Israel's security. is lack of consensus re ects the broader disagreement among American Jews over how to safeguard Israel's security; a disagreement that has developed since the rst Lebanon war (1982) and especially since the rst Palestinian Intifada . 24 At the center of this disagreement has been the issue of the Palestinian territories controlled by Israel since the 1967 War. e debate over Israel's security requirements has created deep divisions within the pro-Israel community in the United States. Indeed, as a result of these divisions the pro-Israel lobby is in reality not a single lobby at all, but is in fact composed of di erent lobbies, each of which advocates di erent policies for Israel and for the United States vis-à-vis Israel. As Dan Fleshler, a longtime pro-Israel activist, writes: " ere is more than one lobby within the organized, self-styled, pro-Israel American Jewish community because there are substantial di erences of opinion about what Israel needs from the United States. " 25 e pro-Israel community is really made up of three di erent lobbies (see gure 1). ese can best be described as a centrist lobby, a le -wing lobby, and a right-wing lobby. e centrist lobby is composed of many of the most established and well-known Jewish organizations-AIPAC, 26 the American Jewish Commit- Consensus politics is based on the conviction that the best way to be in uential is to present a united front before Congress and the White House. Hence, it seeks to represent the consensus of the American Jewish community (more precisely, the organized American Jewish community), 35 when such a consensus exists. When there are di erences of opinion, it attempts to resolve these di erences internally, behind closed doors, then in public support a common position. As a result of this political orientation, the centrist lobby tries to avoid taking clear, strong stances on controversial and polarizing issues.
Hence, although groups in the centrist lobby support the principle of territorial compromise and favor a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian con ict, they do not loudly and energetically promote the establishment of a Palestinian state, nor actively and openly oppose Israel's occupation of the West Bank. In fact, they tend to defend the expansion of Israeli settlements there. In the past, the centrist lobby supported the Oslo peace process and Israel's 2005 disengagement from Gaza, but in both cases, its support was widely regarded as unenthusiastic, if not wary.
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e centrist lobby is more concerned with addressing the threats to Israel's security than in promoting peace processes that will necessarily involve Israeli concessions. Writing about groups in the centrist lobby, Dan Fleshler notes: " eir organizational cultures are most comfortable when they can take forceful stances against Israel's 'enemies'-e.g., Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, and far-le critics of Israel. ey tend to be less comfortable about enthusiastically supporting peace initiatives that require a certain amount of trust in Arab intentions or bold territorial compromises. " 37 For the centrist lobby, being pro-Israel generally means supporting the Israeli government of the day. Whatever the political makeup of the government in Israel, the centrist lobby tries to promote the policies of that government. But the nature of this support may vary, from half-hearted to full-throated. Although the centrist lobby will never publicly criticize or challenge the policy positions of the Israeli government, it will not necessarily lend its full support. What matters to the centrist lobby more than anything else is ensuring American support for Israel. e informal alliance between the United States and Israel is considered to be the cor nerstone of Israeli security. Hence, maintaining this alliance is the central mission of the centrist lobby, which means that the centrist lobby opposes any kind of American pressure on Israel. Moreover, the centrist lobby is generally hostile to public criticism of Israel in the United States or elsewhere. In recent years, the cen-trist lobby has become increasingly concerned with combating what it perceives to be a global campaign spearheaded by Arab and anti-Zionist groups on the le to delegitimize Israel. 38 e single biggest di erence between the centrist lobby and the le -wing and right-wing lobbies is that the latter two are much more willing to challenge and oppose the policies of Israeli governments. Both le -wing and right-wing lobbies have strong views that they forcefully advocate, even if they may be at odds with Israeli government policy or the consensus of the organized American Jewish community. e le -wing and right-wing lobbies are thus based on ideological politics, rather than the consensus politics of the centrist lobby. It is more important to them to express their beliefs and opinions, than echo the views of Israeli governments or the prevailing American Jewish consensus. Fundamentally, they believe they are entitled to "save Israel from itself, " and are not willing to muzzle themselves for the sake of Jewish unity.
e le -wing lobby is made up of "dovish" groups including Ameinu, -in stark contrast, is very hawkish, skeptical of the value of diplomacy and negotiations, suspicious of engagement, and opposed to Israeli concessions to its enemies. It embraces the use of military force, and believes that it should be applied ruthlessly and devastatingly when necessary. Above all, it supports Israel's control of the West Bank (i.e., Greater Israel), and opposes a division of Jerusalem and the establishment of a Palestinian state. e right-wing lobby tends to regard the Palestinians not as potential partners for peace, but as implacable foes of Israel. As such, according to the right-wing lobby, Israeli-Palestinian peace is simply not possible for the foreseeable future. For them, the greatest challenge Israel faces is from the forces of radical Islamism, represented by Hamas, Hezbollah, and, above all, Iran, whose regime the right-wing lobby o en depicts as bent on Israel's destruction.
Because the pro-Israel community in the United States is a highly fractious one, pro-Israel advocacy groups frequently oppose each other. ough there are times when groups in the le -wing and right-wing lobbies can nd enough common ground with groups in the centrist lobby to enable them to work together; the former two, given their radically di erent political orientations and views, do not co-operate with each other. Hence, more o en than not, American policy-makers hear from many di erent voices, each of which claims to be pro-Israel and to represent the views of American Jews. Contrary to the popular belief that the pro-Israel lobby speaks (or shouts) with one loud voice to politicians who ignore it at their political peril, the reality is that there is a cacophony of voices coming from the pro-Israel community, although some generally command more attention from politicians than others.
Can the Center Hold?
e di erent groups in the Israel lobbies are by no means equal. ey vary greatly in size (membership and sta ), nances, and political in uence. Some are merely one-man shows, 53 many others are "shoestring" low-budget operations run out of a single o ce and reliant on volunteers.
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Only a few are well-sta ed, with fancy o ces, and large sums of money at their disposal. AIPAC is the biggest, wealthiest, and most in uential.
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It has 8 o ces around the country, and 300 employees, half of whom work in its large Washington headquarters. AIPAC's sta is highly professional and experienced, and it also has a large national grass-roots network of dedicated unpaid activists. It boasts 100,000 dues-paying members, and a huge $140 million endowment.
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is allowed it to spend almost $2.5 million on lobbying in 2008, much more than any other pro-Israel organization (see gure 2).
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Every year, AIPAC displays its nancial and political muscle at its policy conference in Washington, a massive event that draws thousands of activists (6,500 people attended its policy conference in May 2009), and over half the members of Congress to its gala dinner.
AIPAC is undoubtedly the behemoth among pro-Israel groups. Other groups in the centrist lobby are also a uent and in uential-most notably the AJC and ADL. 58 Indeed, the centrist lobby as a whole commands much more resources, support, and political attention than the le -wing and right-wing lobbies (see gure 3). e centrist lobby has always dominated pro-Israel advocacy in the United States. is dominance re ected the overwhelming desire of American Jewry for unity and solidarity, as well as a widespread unease among American Jews with publicly questioning the decisions of Israeli governments and the choices of Israeli voters. As one scholar of American Jewry observed: "On matters de ned as security-related, Americans Jews, who do not bear the direct consequences of such life and death decisions, are reluctant to second-guess democratically elected Israeli governments. In addition, many Jews expressed concern that Israel's detractors might use criticism of speci c policies to bolster their anti-Israel e orts. "
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Moreover, though the vast majority of American Jews have always supported Israel, especially a er the 1967 War, this support was and is largely an expression of their Jewish identity, rather than ideologically driven. As such, most American Jews naturally gravitate to non-ideological centrist pro-Israel organizations.
Although the centrist lobby remains the most powerful of the three Israel lobbies and continues to vastly outspend its rivals on the le and the right (see gure 3), it is no longer hegemonic. Instead, it is increasingly challenged by both the lewing and right-wing lobbies. Over the last decade or so, this challenge came mostly from the right, from groups like the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) who stridently opposed the Oslo peace process and were outspoken in condemning any territorial compromise with the Palestinians. e collapse of the peace process and the outbreak of the second Intifada appeared to con rm their dire warnings about the dangers of Israeli concessions to the Palestinians, enabling it to increase its support among American Jewry.
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American Jewish public opinion shi ed slightly to the right in reaction to the wave of Palestinian suicide bombings and other violence of the second Intifada. Underlying this rightward shi in opinion was also a growing domestic concern with Islamist extremism, especially a er the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, which led many American Jews to believe that Israel and the United States appeared to face a common enemy, whether it was al-Qaeda, Hamas, or even the PLO.
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Other domestic developments within the United States also helped bolster the right-wing lobby. In particular, evangelical Christians (who number about 75 million people in the US) became increasingly mobilized in support of Israel under the leadership of very prominent and vocal political organizers, preachers, televangelists, and radio talk-show hosts such as Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, Gary Bauer, James C. Dobson, Ralph Reed, and John Hagee. 62 ough regarded with wariness and suspicion by some American Jews, this infusion of Christian evangelical energy, money, and electoral votes was welcomed by the right-wing lobby (as well as by AIPAC in the center). 63 us, a de facto alliance emerged between conservative evangelical Christians and the Jewish right-wing pro-Israel lobby, both of whom were determined to prevent any Israeli territorial withdrawals. Finally, the political dominance of the Republican Party in the United States from 2001 to 2009 (the tenure of President George W. Bush) gave an additional boost to the right-wing lobby since it could reasonably lay claim to having powerful friends in the Bush administration.
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Now the challenge to the centrist lobby is coming primarily from the le -wing lobby. Fueling this challenge has been a backlash within the American Jewish com- munity against an apparent tilt to the right within the pro-Israel community. e support by centrist and right-wing pro-Israel groups for some of the policies of the Bush administration in its "War on Terror, " especially the Iraq war (deeply unpopular among American Jews), together with the perceived suppression of debate within the organized Jewish community over Israel's actions toward the Palestinians, led to a growing feeling of dissatisfaction on the le of the American Jewish community. As a result, le -wing and liberal Jews began speaking out and organizing in greater numbers. 65 e clearest manifestation of this new activism on the le was the formation and rapid rise of J Street, the self-described "pro-peace, proIsrael movement. " Just eighteen months a er its establishment in 2008, J Street was able to hold its rst national conference in Washington, DC, drawing more than 1,500 supporters from across the country, featuring a keynote speech by the US national security adviser James L. Jones, and a gala dinner attended by forty-four members of Congress.
In the buzz of media attention that J Street has received, speculation has focused on whether this new upstart group could displace the mighty AIPAC in the eld of Israel advocacy. 66 Numerous commentators enthused about an AIPAC versus J Street "showdown. " 67 But this showdown is more media hype than a real contest. For one thing, Jeremy Ben-Ami, J Street's executive director, has been careful to avoid being drawn into a public dispute with AIPAC, regularly praising the latter's work and stressing that his organization does not seek to challenge it. 68 AIPAC, in its turn, has refrained from publicly attacking J Street. 69 More important, J Street cannot hope to rival AIPAC, at least not for some time. Although J Street is very tech-savvy and has used the Netroots Internet revolution in politics (pioneered by MoveOn.org and Barack Obama's presidential campaign) to raise signi cant amounts of money online from many small contributions, 70 it is still nancially dwarfed by AIPAC (AIPAC's operating budget in 2008 was $60 million, Nevertheless, though J Street is no match for AIPAC on Capitol Hill, it can weaken AIPAC's in uence by demonstrating that AIPAC does not speak for all American Jews. AIPAC's formidable power rests not only on its size, money, and political connections, but also on a perception in the corridors of power in Washington that it speaks for American Jewry. If J Street undermines this perception, it will lessen AIPAC's power in the long run.
Whether or not J Street succeeds in countering AIPAC, its ascent is evidence of a reinvigorated, more con dent, and more cohesive le -wing lobby. It also under-scores the changing political dynamics within the American Jewish community. In an earlier era the le -wing Jewish organization Breira ("Alternative" in Hebrew) was founded in response to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Like J Street, Breira claimed to support Israel but was strongly critical of its policies, and it too called for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories and a comprehensive peace based on Israeli territorial concessions. Breira attracted a lot of publicity in its day, but the group's activists were ostracized and denounced as traitors by most Jewish professional and communal leaders. e organization was forced to disband shortly a er its rst and only national conference in l977. 75 Although J Street has also been strongly condemned by some groups and individuals within the organized Jewish community, 76 and shunned by the Israeli government, 77 it is highly unlikely to share Breira's fate. 78 Whereas publicly criticizing Israel was almost a taboo within the Jewish community in Breira's day, today such criticism is increasingly common, and comes from the right as well as from the le . Fewer American Jews, especially younger ones, have a deferential attitude toward Israel's government, and more feel entitled and empowered to speak out for what they believe. As J Street's Jeremy Ben Ami declared: "You don't have to be noncritical. You don't have to adopt the party line. It's not, 'Israel, right or wrong. '" 79 As American Jewish supporters of Israel become more assertive and less willing to toe the party line, the centrist lobby will face an uphill struggle to maintain a consensus concerning Israel among American Jews, and could well nd its popular support among Jews slipping. Furthermore, if the right-wing and le -wing lobbies strengthen at the expense of the center, the result will be a growing polarization within the pro-Israel community. Far from being a source of unity, Israel will become an increasingly divisive subject among American Jews.
Conclusion
is article has de ned and disaggregated the pro-Israel lobby in the United States. In doing so, it has tried to o er a more accurate image of the Israel lobby than that conveyed in the overheated debate about the lobby and its in uence on American foreign policy. e article has presented the pro-Israel lobby not as a single entity, but as a conglomeration of three di erent and competing lobbies that o en work at odds with each other. In other words, the pro-Israel lobby in the United States is not a cohesive political actor at all, and should not therefore be discussed as one. Instead, we should recognize the divisions within the pro-Israel community-divisions that are likely to deepen over time-and thus pay more attention to the shiing balance of power between the centrist lobby and its le -wing and right-wing rivals. e future of American pro-Israel advocacy will be shaped by this internal competition between the three camps within the pro-Israel community.
Although it is certainly hazardous to predict which camp is likely to rise or fall, it is safe to say that the dominance of the centrist lobby is more contested than ever before. For the time being it remains much more powerful than the le -wing and right-wing lobbies, but this power may well diminish over time due to political, cultural, and demographic trends within American Jewry. In the near term, however, AIPAC is still very much a force to be reckoned with, especially on Capitol Hill. But this does not mean that American policy-makers will necessarily follow its wishes. To the extent that they are aware that AIPAC does not represent all of American Jewry, and that there are signi cant di erences of opinion between American Jews with regards to Israel, American politicians will be less concerned with incurring AIPAC's wrath.
is awareness is already apparent in the Obama administration's early dealings with the American Jewish community. For example, when Barack Obama's transition team met in December 2008 with Jewish groups to discuss a range of domestic and international issues they invited leaders from twenty-nine Jewish organizations, including a much wider spectrum of Jewish groups than those with which the George W. Bush administration used to meet (among them were AIPAC, ZOA, the Israel Project, JINSA, Israel Policy Forum, Americans for Peace Now, Brit Tzedek v'Shalom, and J Street). 80 In doing so, the new administration openly acknowledged the diversity that exists within the pro-Israel community. An even more explicit acknowledgment of this came from then vice-presidential nominee Joseph Biden speaking to Jewish groups just a month before the 2008 election, when he bluntly stated that AIPAC "doesn't speak for the entire Jewish community or for the State of Israel, " and went on to assert that: "No one in AIPAC or any other organization can question my support of Israel. " 81 In contrast to the Obama administration, the Netanyahu government in Israel has so far appeared much less willing to embrace the pluralism of the pro-Israel community in the United States-as demonstrated by its ambassador to the United States Michael Oren's refusal to accept J Street's invitation to attend its conference. 82 Although the center-right Netanyahu government's distaste for le -wing Jewish groups like J Street is not hard to understand, ultimately this attitude only serves to create greater distance between Israeli governments and their American Jewish critics. A more tolerant attitude would not only foster better relations between Israeli governments and many pro-Israel American Jewish groups, but might also strengthen Israel-Diaspora ties more broadly. is article focuses on American Jewish pro-Israel advocacy. Although Christian pro-Israel advocacy groups (most notably, Christians United for Israel) have gained a large number of supporters and become increasingly well organized and vocal in recent years, American Jewish organizations continue to dominate the eld of pro-Israel advocacy and remain the focus of most public and media attention.
Biographical Information
11. An example of this can be found in an op-ed in the Guardian that claimed:
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is popular image, however, is largely erroneous (it is true that some of the group's leadership and major donors have been supporters of Israel's Likud party). Although AIPAC has frequently supported the policies of Likud governments in Israel, it does so less out of strong ideological convictions than because of its policy of backing all Israeli governments (albeit some more energetically and enthusiastically than others). Moreover, AIPAC has on occasion supported Israeli government initiatives that were deeply unpopular with right-wing hawks, most notably Israel's 2005 disengagement from Gaza. By and large, its activists are not Likudniks and Republicans, but politically centrist American Jews (mostly Democrats) who are primarily concerned for Israel's security and survival. On this point see, Fleshler (2009: 32 John Hagee, pastor of the 18,000-member Cornerstone Church in San Antonio, Texas, has become the main pro-Israel group representing Christian evangelicals. It has a large grass-roots network of supporters, with chapters in y states. In addition to fundraising, the group stages rallies in support of Israel throughout the country, and lobbies policy-makers in Washington, DC. On Capitol Hill, CUFI has focused on cultivating strong ties with lawmakers from the religious right, many of them representing constituencies with only small Jewish communities and who previously had little to do with pro-Israel lobbyists. CUFI aspires to become the Christian version of AIPAC. Like AIPAC, it holds an annual convention in Washington that attracts top politicians and thousands of activists. 63. Schrag (2005) . 64. For example, John Bolton, then US ambassador to the United Nations, was the keynote speaker at the ZOA's national conference in 2005; and Douglas Feith, former under secretary of defense for policy in the Bush administration, was the keynote speaker at its 2008 conference.
